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The Winners in China’s Urban Housing Reform
John R. Logan*, Yiping Fang**, and Zhanxin Zhang†
*Brown University, Sociology, Providence, USA **IHS, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The
Netherlands †Chinese Academy of Social Science, Beijing, China
Abstract
Housing reform in China has proceeded on two tracks: privatization of public housing and
development of a new private housing sector. During this period of transition, rents have remained
relatively low in the remaining public housing, and purchase prices offered to occupants of public
housing have been well below market prices. Although these rents and prices are partly based on
known formulas, there is considerable variability in how much people pay for similar apartments.
This study uses 2000 Census data to estimate the housing subsidy received by the remaining
renters in the public sector and purchasers of public housing, based on private sector prices for
housing of comparable quality and size. The paper also analyzes variation in the estimated
discount from market prices that these people receive. The findings show that the biggest winners
in China’s transition from socialist housing allocation are those who were favored in the previous
system, based on such factors as residence status, education and occupation.
Keywords
Comparative housing; housing privatization; housing tenure; China
Introduction
In the early 1980s the Chinese Government announced that the national policy of economic
reform would be extended to the housing sector, first by raising public housing rents to
market prices and then by privatizing housing production and consumption. These changes
would radically change a system in which most urban residents relied on their work units or
on municipal housing authorities to provide shelter at highly subsidized rents (Logan et al.,
1999). Indeed, an apartment allocated by a person’s employer was almost free, but it was
also likely to be small, poorly equipped and hard to obtain. Reform could require people to
pay more for housing (compensated only partly by rising wage levels), but it could also spur
investment in a housing stock that had fallen far behind people’s needs (Kosareva & Struyk,
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1993; World Bank, 1992). And it also had the potential to weaken workers’ lifelong
dependency on their employers.
More than two decades later, it is possible to evaluate the privatization process and in
particular to investigate its distributive consequences. Not surprisingly, the transition to a
market system has been only partial. Indeed, there is an emerging private rental housing
market due to the increasing labor mobility and rapid economic development. The growth of
a new affluent class of entrepreneurs and professionals has also supported an expansion of
housing construction for sale at market prices. Yet a considerable (if declining) share of
public housing continues to be occupied by renters, and purchasers of public housing have
been highly subsidized. This means that there are effectively at least two types of system
operating today in China. Sato (2006) describes these as an ‘internal’ market that has
developed from within the welfare system and an ‘open’ market that is still being created. It
is unclear how long the system will continue in this transitional phase, or at what point
people will be making housing choices largely in terms of the standard market criteria of
price, quality and location.
In the meantime the type of housing that people live in depends not only on their market
resources but also—and in fact mostly—on their position in the pre-reform system. Similar
to the experience in several other countries, privatization of public housing took the form of
transferring ownership to tenants. In the Chinese case this had to be accomplished in an
economy where most people had little access to capital, with only the beginning of a system
of home mortgages and no recent history of market pricing. Privatization had to be
subsidized, while public rental housing continued to be priced below market levels.
This paper examines who were the winners in this particular phase of China’s
‘marketization’ policy. This question is pursued through analysis of Census micro-level data
in the year 2000 from eight major cities that include information on types of housing tenure,
various measures of quality and cost. Concretely, the paper asks who is paying less for better
housing by virtue of state subsidy?
Similar questions have been raised in other countries where public housing underwent
privatization. It has been widely reported that the privatization of public housing in Eastern
Europe and the Russian Federation after 1990 represented substantial transfers of wealth in
the form of giveaways and discounted sales of public housing apartments to sitting tenants.
Discounted sales and the free transfer of public housing to sitting tenants are rationalized as
enabling strategies that restore housing market demand and increase mobility and housing
choice (Angel, 2000). It is also said that the policy is a form of payback for a process of
many years when households ‘financed capital subsidies for past investment with forced
savings through the wage repression mechanism’ (Buckley, 1996, p. 40). However, since not
all citizens benefit from the privatization policy, it is essential to evaluate more carefully the
distributional impacts.
Kosareva & Struyk (1993, p. 97) note that evidently ‘housing privatization potentially
involves an enormous transfer of wealth to individual households’. In major Russian cities
in 1992, for example, they estimated the market value of an average public housing unit at
more than six times the average annual family income. To achieve rapid privatization the
prices were highly subsidized. For example, in Hungary approximately 35 per cent of the
public housing stock existing in 1990 had been privatized by 1993 at prices between 15 per
cent and 40 per cent of market value (Hegedüs & Tosics, 1994). Pickvance (1994, pp. 435–
436) points out that in Hungary even before privatization of public housing those persons
with higher occupational status benefited from both the original socialist system and the
expansion of the private housing stock: first by being allocated the most attractive state
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housing, then by cashing in on the value of these apartments by selling occupancy rights to
new tenants, and finally by purchasing on favorable terms in the private sector. Kosareva &
Struyk (1993) make a similar evaluation for Russia, that higher-income households occupied
the more valuable public housing and (since prices were only modestly adjusted for quality
and in any case were much lower than market valuation) therefore received larger transfers
of wealth through privatization. Other research suggests that the impacts varied by country.
Yemtsov (2007), for example, studies three countries, Russia, Serbia and Poland. His
findings suggest that public housing privatization strongly increased wealth inequality in
Russia and Serbia, but resulted in less wealth inequality in Poland. Yemtsov argues that the
impact of privatization depends on two factors at the national level—the size of the
privatized stock and the policies that countries put in place to promote homeownership.
Cheap prices do not necessarily make a good investment. The actual value of public housing
depends in large part on the quality of initial construction and need for repair. In Britain, for
example, sometimes the better units were sold and the low-quality units had no takers. In
other cases low-income families, lured by the prospect of homeownership, took on loan
burdens that they could not sustain, or they were unable to keep their homes in good repair
(Karn & Wolman, 1992). The other side of this question is that many people remain in
public rental housing, and it is necessary to ask what is the quality and rental rate for that
housing. Again in the British case, it has been argued that local authority housing was
‘worth’ considerably more than the remaining tenants were paying in rent (Willis &
Nicholson, 1991), so those who continued to rent in this sector certainly did better than those
who rented in the private sector.
Therefore, in order to evaluate who came out ahead in housing privatization in China, it is
necessary to determine what is being paid and what a comparable unit would cost in the
private sector. For those who purchase public housing, this is the difference between their
purchase price and the prices paid for those who bought private market housing. For those
who continue to rent in the public sector, it is the difference between their rents (adjusted for
quality) and rents paid by people in the private market.
The Chinese Case
In comparison to Eastern Europe, where the overall share of state-owned housing at the end
of the socialist period was only 28 per cent (Hegedüs & Tosics, 1996), public housing in
China was absolutely dominant in urban areas before the reform. Huang (2004) reports that
75 per cent of households were in the public rental housing sector through the socialist
period, and the share might be even bigger in large cities (Logan et al., 1999). Because rents
were set at extremely low levels (less than 1 per cent of household income according to
Wang & Murie (1999)), public housing was heavily subsidized, and one motivation for
housing reform was to reduce the burden on municipal and work unit budgets (Yang &
Wang, 1995). Housing reform began in 1988 with rent reform, increasing rent to reflect real
housing costs. At the same time, a wage adjustment was mandated to provide offsetting
compensation to workers. In no case was rent raised more than the cash subsidy. This policy
reinforced inequalities between work units without redistributing housing: since rich units
can provide more subsidies, they recapture most wage adjustment (World Bank, 1992). The
rent increase was later followed by a plan to shift public housing to private ownership and to
promote development of market housing. As of 2000, the share of public rental housing
nationally was 16.33 per cent, and in Beijing it was 33.82 per cent (Logan et al., 2009), and
it has been declining since that time.
A key question for China’s policy makers was how to price the sale of public housing. Their
approach was to set a standard price of construction in each city, based on floor space, and
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to adjust it according to characteristics of the location, the building and the housing unit
itself. The discount rate was also adjusted according to characteristics of the purchaser. To
illustrate these rules, the paper here describes the pricing formula that was applied to
housing controlled by central government institutions in Beijing (for details, see http://
www.ggj.gov.cn/zcfg/zfzdgg/200510/t20051020_2042.htm). The most significant locational
factor in that scheme was an assessment of land values in the neighborhood, which could
vary the price by as much as 30 per cent. Access to shopping, availability of public
transportation and other public infrastructure were also taken into account. A building factor
adjustment considered such features as the age of the structure (buildings more than 30 years
old, for example, were discounted by 30 per cent), building materials, elevators and height.
Unit characteristics included which floor the apartment was on (favoring the highest floors
in buildings with elevators, and floors 3–4 in buildings without elevators) and the direction
faced by bedroom windows (with a 3 per cent discount for west-facing bedrooms).
The amount of subsidy provided under the Beijing Government housing regulations also
depended on the employee’s job rank. This is routine in China, where since the mid-1950s
government regulations have established official standards for housing space that
institutionalized cadre privilege (Zhou & Logan, 1996). For the lowest level administrative
position (Ke and below), for example, employees were considered qualified for an
apartment of 60 m2. This meant that the tenant would receive a subsidized price on the first
60 m2, but would pay the standard price for additional space. A Ju level official, in contrast,
qualified for a subsidy on up to 120 m2.
There is considerable variation in how different work units applied rules such as these. The
‘standard price’ (not a market price) often depended on seniority. Beginning in the 1990s the
state introduced a mandatory Housing Provident Fund to which employees were required to
contribute a fraction (around 5 per cent) of their salary, matched by the employer, for the
purpose of financing a housing purchase (Yeung & Howes, 2006). Employers are required
to set up this savings account for employees, and the money in this account can only be
withdrawn when the employee buys a house or retires. An additional subsidy provided by
many work units is based on the number of years that the person was working prior to
establishment of the Housing Provident Fund (and if the spouse was in the same work unit,
those years would also be counted). In addition, work units that owned or controlled housing
were free to offer different prices for different tenants. But for those who did not work for a
government agency and whose work unit controlled no housing, as well as those who could
not qualify for any subsidy (i.e. persons who are not employed, or who do not have a local
urban registration), privatization offered no benefits.
As a starting point, the study hypothesizes that if there is a benefit to public housing
purchase or remaining a public housing renter (compared to purchase or rental in the private
market) the benefit will most likely be distributed in a way that mirrors past practices. Thus
it is important to document which workers had been favored in housing allocation in the
past. Formally housing was a welfare benefit to be distributed based on merit and need. Yet
there is considerable evidence that in China, like other socialist countries (Szelenyi, 1983),
individuals of higher socio-economic and political status have had privileged access to
housing of good quality and at a low cost. Logan et al. (1999) showed that housing was
allocated partly on the basis of seniority through a continuous process over time of
negotiating for larger or better-equipped housing. Income, education and Communist Party
membership had positive effects on the size and quality of housing, as did employment in a
larger and administratively more powerful work unit. Pan (2004) found that Communist
Party membership was associated with larger housing size and higher housing quality in
both 1988 and 1995. Davis (2003) showed that workers with more seniority in higher-
ranked work units were more likely to receive better housing.
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There is little research on access to housing in the post-1990 period when the marketization
policy was greatly expanded. One exception is Sato’s (2006) study of prices for housing
purchased during 1996–1999. Sato reported that seniority, education, work unit
administrative rank and party membership resulted in reduced prices for housing purchased
in the public sector. Sato also documented the disadvantages of migrants in the emerging
housing market (on this point see also Logan et al., 2009). Most migrant households have to
rent or sublet housing owned by urban households, often at very high prices. Rent and
utilities amounted to an average of 26 per cent of total household expenditure for migrants,
compared to only 7 per cent for locally registered urban households, largely because of
migrants’ exclusion from public rental housing.
Research Design
It was expected that similar disparities would be found in the prices paid for housing. This
study uses 2000 Census micro-data (a public use sample of 0.1 per cent) to quantify the
differences in prices in the public and private sector for both housing purchase and rentals.
The Population Census in 2000 provided detailed information on housing for all family
households. It identified six modes of housing tenure for these households. These include
two rental categories, renting from the public sector (municipalities or work units) and
renting in the private market. There are four types of ownership, distinguishing how the
home was acquired: self-built housing, purchase of former public rental housing, purchase at
market prices, and purchase at discounted (‘economic’) prices. This paper focuses on the
transition of housing tenure from public to market forms, thus the self-built housing group is
not included in the analysis. The 2000 Census actually reflects information in 1999, just one
year after the official termination of public housing provision. The purchase of public rental
housing by sitting tenants has continued since that time, and the analysis does not include
those purchases.
This source has the advantage of broad coverage of urban China. It includes residents of
eight of the largest cities: Beijing, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Harbin, Nanjing, Shanghai,
Tianjin and Xi’an. There are significant regional differences. For example, Huang and Clark
(2002) found in a national housing survey that nearly half of total variation in tenure choice
is between cities (see also Li & Wu, 2004). Such differences are acknowledged by the
inclusion of city dummy variables in the multivariate models, so that all prices are in effect
measured from the city average. Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing and Guangzhou are
major coastal cities, usually considered to have been earlier to introduce market reforms and
to experience rapid economic expansion (especially Guangzhou, which is located close to
Hong Kong). Chongqing, Xi’an, and Harbin (and to some extent also Tianjin, which was
long dominated by state-run industrial enterprises) are regarded as late developers. However,
all have populations that would define them as megacities on a world scale.
These data have important limitations. Persons in collective housing (very common for
migrants in work unit dormitories) are excluded, for whom expenditures are not reported in
the Census, or self-built housing (the usual source for rural villagers) where the building cost
is not comparable to other owner-occupied housing. The Census identifies five tenure types
that can be compared. In the public sector these are public purchase by sitting tenants and
public rentals (which could be from the municipal housing bureau or from the person’s work
unit, alternatives that cannot be distinguished in the 2000 Census). Public purchase is
compared with two tenure categories that are treated as market-based: market purchase
(including most housing sold at market prices) and ‘economic purchase’ (a form of private
housing where builders pass on limited construction subsidies to qualifying buyers,
including the categories of Jinji shiyong zhufang and Anju gongzheng housing. Because the
economic purchase category, which explicitly involves a price subsidy, is included in the
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models, the analyses reflect the overall differences between public purchase and market-
based purchases. The additional subsidy from ‘economic purchase’ is estimated in the
coefficient for that variable in the market purchase model. The date of purchase is not
reported, but the study is able to control for whether persons have lived in their current
neighborhood for more or less than five years. Because all forms of purchase increased
greatly during the late 1990s, it is not thought that rising purchase prices bias this
comparison. Current (1999) rents are compared for public and private rental housing. In both
the owner and renter sectors all prices are provided by the Census in categories, which are
coded to the category midpoint. Values in the top category are coded to the category’s
minimum value.
Hedonic models (Follain & Jimenez, 1985; Rosen, 1974) are estimated to determine how
purchase prices and rents in the private sector are related to characteristics of the housing
unit. In such models it is expected that larger size, higher quality, existence of amenities and
better accessibility should all predict a higher housing price. Hedonic models have been
applied in studies of the impact of urban green spaces in Guangzhou (Jim & Chen, 2006)
and Jinan (Kong et al., 2007). A pre-condition for the successful application of hedonic
pricing is the existence of a mature housing market that is achieving equilibrium. This is of
course not the case for China, so the results reported here should be interpreted as a first
approximation. The purpose is to apply the hedonic model coefficients to housing units in
the public sector, estimating what approximate comparable units would cost if they were in
the private market. The difference between this estimated cost (or ‘market value’) is what
will then be treated as the subsidy received by public sector purchasers or tenants.
The models use all available housing characteristics from the Census. Housing space is
measured in square meters, and a second-order term is included to test for non-linearity.
Housing quality is an index ranging from 0 to 100 based on five equally weighted aspects of
housing units: with or without kitchen, energy source for cooking (gas is treated as the
favorable type), with or without tap water, bath facilities and individual toilet. Number of
rooms (that is, having smaller rooms in a given space) is usually considered to be a negative
quality. Building types are categorical variables: low-rise, high-rise and courtyard housing.
There are few cases of courtyard housing among market purchasers, so this housing type is
excluded from the analysis of owner housing. Building age is the number of years since
construction.
Based on these variables and hedonic models for private market housing, the ‘market value’
of apartments in the public sector and the subsidy received by public sector participants is
estimated. In turn, the personal characteristics associated with receiving higher or lower
levels of subsidy are analyzed. These models also make use of the limited number of
characteristics that are available from the Census.
A key predictor is residence status, which uses three types of information. The first is
whether the person was born in the current city of residence (to distinguish migrants from
natives). The second adds an institutional status, whether the person has a rural or urban
household registration (i.e. agricultural or non-agricultural eligibility). The third is related to
length of residence in the city among migrants. A person who was living in the current city
before 1995 is treated as an ‘established’ resident; someone who has arrived within the last
five years is ‘recent’. Combining these three criteria leads to six categories of residence
status: urban natives; rural villagers; established urban migrants; recent urban migrants;
established rural migrants; and recent rural migrants. All cases of public purchase have
urban and local registration, because there were too few such owners with rural or non-local
registration to be studied.
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A related variable is the spouse’s registration status, which is combined with marital status
into a ‘living status’ variable with three categories: living with a spouse with urban
registration; living with a spouse with rural registration; and living without a spouse. Does
the registration status of one spouse compensate for that of the other? In 1998 a reform of
the hukou system made it easier for an urbanite’s migrant spouse to apply for urban
registration. However, the process is not easy, and there remained many households in 2000
where spouses had different types of registration.
Another variable relevant to trends in prices is recent relocation within the city (within the
last five years). In this dataset ‘moves’ are recorded only if the person changes
neighborhood (street district). ‘Recent movers’ are defined as persons who moved across
neighborhoods in the past five years.
The socio-economic variables available from the Census include education, spouse’s
education (for those living with their spouse), and occupation. Education is measured as
years of schooling. Occupation is a set of dummy variables ranging from work unit heads
and professionals/technicians at the top to agricultural laborers at the bottom, with separate
categories for persons who are retired or not employed. Following the precedent of studies
of housing tenure in China, the study introduces gender, age (treated as a possible non-linear
effect), and household size as demographic control variables.
Results
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the eight-city sample. By a large margin the
majority of cases of owner-occupied housing and rental housing are public sector, with
slightly more cases of public purchase than continuing public rental. In the period since
2000, not shown here, there has been a more pronounced shift toward public purchase, with
some increase in market purchase and private rental. Table 1 shows how the central
variables in the analysis (space and quality) vary across different tenure categories, and also
the average prices (purchase cost or rent per square meter). Market purchased housing is
subdivided into two categories: commodity housing (at full market prices) and economic
purchase (at somewhat discounted prices through a limited government program).
Commodity housing tends to be considerably larger than other owner-occupied housing, but
not to be of much higher average quality than public purchased housing. Yet on average its
price is nearly five times as high per square meter. Public rental housing on average is larger
than private rental housing, and is of much higher quality (although lower quality than any
category of owner-occupied housing). Its price is less than one-quarter as much per square
meter. These price comparisons and the advantage that public sector housing represents to
leaseholders and owners are the motivation for this study.
The next step in the analysis is to estimate hedonic models of housing expenditures among
owners and renters in market housing. Results are presented in Table 2. The dependent
variable is the log of purchase price or monthly rent. For reference, the Table provides the
mean values of space, housing quality, number of rooms and building age for both types of
housing, and also the mean values of the purchase price or monthly rent for each city.
Economic purchase is grouped together with the market purchase housing group to calculate
the hedonic coefficient in Beijing, while a dummy variable is added for economic purchase
housing. Market purchased housing is larger, higher quality and newer than market rentals.
Purchase prices on average are lowest in Xian and Chongqing and highest in Guangzhou,
Shanghai and Beijing. Rental prices are lowest in Xi’an, Harbin and Tianjin, and higher in
Guangzhou and Beijing.
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The model for private market owners provides a remarkably good prediction with an
adjusted explained variance of 0.604. Coefficients are significant and in the expected
direction. Space in square meters has a strong positive effect, diminishing somewhat at high
values. Housing quality is strongly related to purchase price. High-rise construction is more
expensive, but older buildings command lower prices. For a given amount of floor space,
apartments divided into more and smaller rooms cost less. The coefficient for ‘economic
purchase’ shows a substantial discount. Prices in Tianjin and Nanjing are not significantly
different from Beijing. Guangzhou and Shanghai are considerably more expensive, while
Chongqing, Xi’an and Harbin have significantly lower prices.
The model for private market renters is less robust, but still explains 0.338 of the variance in
rents. Rents increase linearly with space and quality. High-rise buildings have higher rents
than low-rise apartments, while courtyard housing is less expensive. Surprisingly, building
age is unrelated to rents, perhaps because building quality and construction type have been
controlled. Rents in all other cities are lower than in Beijing, especially in Chongqing,
Harbin and Xi’an.
The final step in this analysis is to determine which residents in the public sector live in
housing of higher estimated market value and who receives a higher level of subsidy
(discount from the market value in the actual purchase price or rent paid). One important
missing variable in the private sector models is location, because the Census micro-data
offer no geographic detail within cities. When the hedonic equations are applied to estimate
the market value of housing in the public sector, results would be overestimated if public
purchase and public rental housing tends to be found in worse locations than corresponding
private market units. In fact, there is reason to believe that the approach leads to
underestimates of the value of public sector housing. Research on land and housing prices
generally shows that inner-city locations are more highly valued. For example Zheng &
Kahn (2008) report that land prices and purchase prices for new condominiums in Beijing in
2004–2005 declined at a rate of about 4 per cent per kilometer from the center of the city at
Tiananmen Square. Figure 1 shows that in Beijing (mapping aggregated Census data for
neighborhoods [jie dao] in 2000) the share of rental units that is public sector housing is
much higher in the inner districts than at the periphery of the urban area. The correlation
between public rental share and distance from the center of the city (weighting
neighborhood areas by the total number of rental units) is −0.48. Hence public sector rental
housing tends to be found in higher value locations. There is a smaller but not significant
negative correlation between the share of owner housing that is public purchase (not
counting self-built housing) and distance from the center (−0.16). Purchase of work unit
housing in factory locations outside the city partly offsets the concentration of public
purchase in the inner districts.
Li & Siu (1997) studied the city of Guangzhou and concluded that in the subsidized sectors,
the pricing of the housing units (including both the selling price and the rent charged) is still
far from ‘rational’: prices and rents increase rather than decrease with distance from the city
center. It is thought this difference is due to the lower quality of housing in the inner city,
which Li & Siu did not account for.
Table 3 reports the estimated average discount rates for all of the cities. On average the
discount on public purchase housing (compared to market purchase housing) was 38 per
cent. Discount rates varied across cities, highest in Beijing and Xi’an and lowest in
Shanghai. The average discount rate on monthly rent was 28 per cent, with a high of 37 per
cent in Guangzhou and a low of 21 per cent in Tianjin. These levels of subsidy are in line
with estimates cited above for Hungary in the 1990s. It is also possible to estimate the
aggregate value of the subsidies in each city, applying the sample values to the full urban
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population. There is a substantial redistribution of wealth, nearly $30 billion for the public
housing that had been purchased by tenants up to 1999 and more than $9 billion in Shanghai
alone. The annual rent subsidy for those who continued to live in public rental housing was
more than $1.2 billion. Note from the analysis above that a majority of family households in
these cities benefited from these subsidies. Those who are excluded entirely from this
analysis are people in collective households, the predominant form of housing for rural-
urban migrants; this aspect of marketization only indirectly affected these people.
The paper now turns to the question of which public purchasers and which public renters
received the greatest benefit. The results for public sector housing are presented in Tables 4
and 5. In almost every case the purchase price or rent is lower than the estimated market
value. It is thought that the exceptions represent situations where the apartment is in a
particularly favorable location and the hedonic model underestimates the market value.
Hence, in cases with an estimated negative subsidy the discount ratio has been recoded to
reflect a subsidy of at least 500 yuan for public purchase and 0.50 yuan per month for public
rental. Note that in these models, all variables are characteristics of the head of household or
spouse. Characteristics of the housing unit itself are summarized in the estimated market
value. The city of residence is included here, because housing policies vary across urban
China and it has been shown that the discount ratio also varied.
Table 4 provides results for persons who purchased their public housing apartment. The
estimated market value of their apartment is highest in Guangzhou and Shanghai and lowest
in Chongqing, Harbin and Xi’an. Older household heads and those with larger households
live in more valuable apartments. The education of both the household head and spouse has
significant positive effects. Not surprisingly, persons who are the head of their work unit
own the most valuable housing, followed by staff workers (cadres). Manual workers and
retired/unemployed persons live in the least valuable homes. Residence status has a
substantial effect. Note that this analysis includes no persons with rural or non-local
registration. However, compared to a native person with urban and local registration, recent
migrants with similar registration purchased more valuable apartments, as did established
migrants to a lesser degree. Persons living without a spouse own more valuable apartments
than persons married to a spouse with urban registration, but those whose spouse has a rural
registration own significantly less valuable homes. Finally, recent movers within the city
(those who changed neighborhoods in the last five years) live in substantially more valuable
homes, which may partially reflect recent construction.
These results are consistent with expectations about who could afford a better apartment or
who had been living in a better public rental apartment and was therefore in a position to
purchase it. A separate question is how large a subsidy they received when they purchased.
This discount ratio is analyzed in the second column of Table 4. Here it can be seen that the
discount ratio was higher in every other city than in Beijing, with the exception of Xi’an.
The highest subsidies were in Shanghai, Tianjin and Nanjing. Older persons received a
higher subsidy (a non-linear effect that may be related to seniority). Few other variables are
significant. There are significant positive effects of higher education and being retired
(possibly associated with age and seniority). Recent migrants received a smaller subsidy, as
did those who moved more recently within the city.
Patterns are somewhat different among public housing tenants (Table 5). City effects show
that tenants in Beijing occupy the most valuable housing, with the lowest values in
Chongqing and Xi’an. Male heads of households rent less valuable apartments, while older
persons and larger households rent more valuable apartments. Education (both for head of
household and spouse) and high ranked occupation (work unit heads, administrative staff
and professionals/technicians) are positively related to estimated rental value. In the public
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rental sector some are found to have rural registration. Compared to urban natives, the recent
migrants with urban registration live in more valuable apartments, while those of established
rural migrants are less valuable. Unexpectedly, there is a positive coefficient for recent rural
migrants, and having a spouse with rural registration does not affect rental value. Persons
living without a spouse occupy more valuable rentals. Finally, recent movers within the city
rent more valuable apartments.
Why do recent rural migrants live in more valuable public rental housing than do urban
natives? A starting point is the observation that recent rural migrants are unlikely to have
access to public rentals because under usual circumstances they do not qualify. In some
cases, however, migrants are offered work unit housing tied to their job. Recent migrants in
public rental housing, whether with urban or rural registration, tend to live in newer units,
which tend to be built to a higher standard,
Yet recent rural migrants have a disadvantage relative to urban natives in the price they pay.
Residence status counts heavily in predicting the discount ratio for public rentals. Compared
to urban natives, all other categories of persons receive smaller rent subsidy, although the
gap for established urban migrants is small. Recent rural migrants receive the least subsidy.
Persons married to a spouse with rural registration also receive smaller subsidy, as do recent
movers.
It was also found that men receive a smaller discount from estimated market value than
women, while older persons receive higher discounts. Subsidy of public housing rents is
highest in Nanjing and lowest in Chongqing. Although higher education and occupation are
associated with living in more valuable apartments, they are not related to the level of
subsidy. It is suspected (although the information to test this explanation is not available)
that workers with higher education and occupation levels are more likely to be employed in
higher ranked work units, which historically have been able to provide higher quality
housing for their employees. In that case, their access to better housing would be based not
on their individual privilege but on the standing of their employer.
Discussion and Conclusion
For potential beneficiaries the opportunity to take advantage of these deals is time-limited.
Comparing tabulations from Census 2000 with data that have been made available from the
2005 mini-Census, the study found that the share of rental housing that is in the public sector
declined from over 70 per cent to under 40 per cent in just five years. By 2005 only 8 per
cent of urban housing units were public rentals, leaving few tenants with prospects for
purchasing their unit. At the same time the share of market housing purchased with no
discount nearly doubled, and it seems clear that most newly constructed owner-occupied
housing in the future will be in the private sector. Hence in a period of about 20 years,
starting slowly around 1990 and now nearly complete, China has achieved its intended
restructuring of the urban housing system.
It has been found, consistent with most results elsewhere and the expectations of Chinese
urban researchers (e.g. Chen, 1996), that this policy has brought a windfall to those who
could take advantage of it. It was also found that those who have been able to remain in
public rental housing for the time being receive better accommodation at lower rents than
people who rent in the private sector. What were the distributional impacts of these benefits?
If the question were simply who could purchase public housing the answer would be self-
evident—it would be those who had been able to qualify for public rental housing (or better
quality housing) under the previous system. This is why, for example, in Table 3 there are
no cases of rural migrants. They had been largely excluded from public housing in the
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socialist period and even those rural migrants who received public rental housing were not
eligible to buy it. The analysis mainly addresses a second-level question: among those who
qualified to purchase their public housing unit, and among those who continued to rent
public housing in 2000, who got the best housing and who received the most favorable
terms?
The allocation of the best non-market housing in 2000 (estimated in terms of its market
worth) closely matches the priorities for allocation of apartments under socialism, and here
patterns are similar for public purchase and public rental. One criterion of need stands out:
household size. Persons who were better placed in their work unit (older persons with more
seniority, those with higher education, work unit leaders and administrative staff or
professional/technical workers) were favored. Migrants and persons with rural registration
did worse, as did those whose spouse had rural registration. It may seem surprising that there
is one category of migrants who fared well. These are migrants with urban registration,
people whom some scholars have called ‘permanent migrants’ (Wu, 2002). The Chinese
term is qianyi (permanently migrated), different from zanzhu (temporarily settled). Persons
can gain entitlement to this change if they are recruited by a state-owned enterprise or by
enrollment in an institution of higher education, thereby gaining full legal access to all city
public resources. Urban migrants have done better in the urban housing system than natives
with urban registration.
It is anticipated that studies using other data sources would show that other privileged
groups in the socialist housing system also have been able to obtain more valuable housing.
These would be especially members of the Communist Party and employees of larger and
more highly ranked work units. These hypotheses cannot be tested with Census data.
Although previously favored groups obtained the best housing in the public sector, they did
not necessarily get it with a higher discount from its market value. In both the public
purchase and public rental models, older persons receive greater benefit. Education counts in
the purchase model but not for rentals. No occupational differences are found in the rental
model, and for purchase it turns out to be retired people rather than work unit heads, staff, or
professionals/technicians who got a higher subsidy. This means that in many respects the
pricing of public sector housing did not redistribute resources. Indeed, it could be argued
that aside from the cumulative prior advantages of some groups under socialism the
privatization process was carried out in an equitable way. Possibly the application of
bureaucratic criteria such as those described above for government-controlled housing in
Beijing generally succeeded in translating housing characteristics into prices. Note,
however, that the absolute value of privileged persons’ discount might be higher, simply
because they already occupied better located, larger flats, and price inflation after 2000
probably accentuated differences in the absolute value of the purchase subsidy.
There is, nevertheless, one dimension of state policy that factors heavily into housing
outcomes, and that is residence status. Among purchasers of public housing, there are no
rural villagers or rural migrants. Recent urban migrants and recent movers received smaller
discounts in purchasing public housing. Rural villagers, rural migrants, and persons whose
spouse has rural registration are substantially disadvantaged in the pricing of public rental
housing. It is not migrant status in itself that matters, since migrants with urban registration
may even have some advantages. The continuing state policy to distinguish between urban
and rural registration has placed citizens with the latter status at a severe disadvantage in the
process of housing reform. In this respect the findings reinforce other studies that focus
particularly on the rural-urban divide in Chinese social policy.
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Figure 1.
Per cent of rental housing in the public rental sector, Beijing urban neighborhoods in 2000
(four inner city districts outlined in white). Source: 2000 Census files (jie dao data) provided
by Department of Geography, Peking University.
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Table 1
Average size, quality and cost of housing by tenure, eight-city sample
N Per capita space (m2) Quality index Cost per square meter
Purchase:
  Market 1177 33.2 90.2 $ 252.66
  Economic 722 24.9 85.6 $ 107.13
  Public 4594 23.6 89.5 $ 53.14
Rental:
  Market 1061 14.2 58.0 $1.39 /month
  Public 4303 17.3 72.3 $0.30 /month
Note: Exchange rate 1999: 1 dollar = 8.28 RMB.
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Table 2
Hedonic model of housing expenditure among market owners and market renters
Market owners Market renters
Mean Coefficient Mean Coefficient
Constant 2.666** 5.065**
Area space (m2) 76.13 0.030** 28.58 0.011**
Square of area space
−7.04E-5** −1.63E-05
Housing quality index 90.23 0.007** 58.33 0.006**
Building type (Reference: Apartment)
  High-rise 0.215** 0.377**
  Courtyard −
−0.294**
Number of rooms 2.18
−0.153** 1.33 −0.023
Building age (years old) 6.39
−0.037** 13.49 −0.001
Economic purchase $7338
−0.647** −
City (Reference: Beijing) $17,766 $36.8
  Chongqing $7391
−0.871** $ 23.5 −1.000**
  Guangzhou $23,853 0.226** $ 48.6 −0.194*
  Harbin $10,833
−0.289** $ 24.4 −0.743**
  Nanjing $14,396 −0.029 $ 26.4
−0.434**
  Shanghai $22,210 0.387** $ 24.1 −0.445**
  Tianjin $15,495 0.054 $ 20.8
−0.564**
  Xian $6727
−0.487** $ 19.8 −0.766**
N 1751 1029
Degree of freedom 14 14
Adjusted r square 0.604 0.338
Notes:
*p < 0.05
**p < 0.01
Cost for renters is cost per month; Exchange rate 1999: 1 dollar = 8.28 RMB.
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Table 3
Average discounts and estimated total subsidy for public housing
Public purchase housing Public rental housing
Mean discount Estimated total
subsidy (millions)
Mean discount Estimated annual
subsidy (millions)
Beijing 0.52 $5289 0.24 $400
Chongqing 0.48 $813 0.35 $43
Guangzhou 0.35 $4366 0.37 $79
Harbin 0.40 $1500 0.32 $55
Nanjing 0.29 $2303 0.23 $78
Shanghai 0.25 $9279 0.30 $305
Tianjin 0.31 $2030 0.21 $196
Xi’an 0.52 $849 0.31 $23
Total 0.38 $28,700 0.28 $1247
Notes: Exchange rate 1999: 1 dollar = 8.28 RMB.
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Table 4
Regression on estimated market value of public purchase housing and the ratio of the discount represented by
the actual price paid
Housing market value Discount ratio
Constant 3.178** 0.112*
City (Reference: Beijing)
  Chongqing
−0.831** 0.037**
  Guangzhou 0.282** 0.186**
  Harbin
−0.489** 0.160**
  Nanjing
−0.083* 0.234**
  Shanghai 0.170** 0.270**
  Tianjin −0.024 0.220**
  Xi’an
−0.542** −0.003
Male or female (Reference: male) 0.015 0.013
Household head age 0.011* 0.011**
Age squared −8.02E-05
−7.98E-005**
Household size 0.036** −0.002
Years of education 0.022** 0.003*
Spouse years of education 0.013** −0.001
Occupation (Reference: manual worker)
  Head of work unit 0.228** 0.013
  Professional/technician 0.068* 0.011
  Staff or other personnel 0.180** 0.007
  Commercial or services 0.098** 0.008
  Retired −0.006 0.032*
  Other unemployed 0.019 0.014
Residence status
Reference: urban native
  Established urban migrant 0.047* −0.007
  Recent urban migrant 0.532** −0.104**
Living status (Reference: living with urban registration spouse)
  No spouse 0.101* −0.031
  With rural registration spouse
−0.238** 0.013
Recent within city move 0.508** −0.048**
N 4357 4357
Degree of freedom 24 24
Adjusted r squared 0.402 0.241
Notes:
Hous Stud. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2013 October 23.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
Logan et al. Page 19
*p < 0.05
**p < 0.01
Dependent variable for the first model is ln (predicted market value of public purchase housing). Dependent variable for the second model is (1-
(actual cost of public purchase housing)/(predicted market value)).
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Table 5
Regression on estimated market rental value of public rental housing and the ratio of the discount represented
by the actual rent paid
Market rental value Discount ratio
(Constant) 5.015** 0.765**
City (reference: Beijing)
  Chongqing
−0.879** −0.099**
  Guangzhou −0.047
−0.074**
  Harbin
−0.422** −0.056**
  Nanjing
−0.236** 0.030*
  Shanghai
−0.383** −0.044**
  Tianjin
−0.446** 0.015
  Xi’an
−0.837** −0.074**
Male or female (Reference: male)
−0.041* −0.015*
Household head age 0.011** 0.004**
Age square
−8.81E-005** −3.87E-005**
Household size 0.050** −0.005
Years of education 0.015** −0.001
Spouse years of education 0.008** −0.002
Occupation (Reference: manual worker)
  Head of work unit 0.213** −0.033
  Professional/technician 0.086** 0.018
  Staff or other personnel 0.070* −0.008
  Commercial or services 0.031
−0.021*
  Retired 0.003 0.001
  Other unemployed 0.025 0.013
Residence status (Reference: urban natives)
  Rural villagers 0.091
−0.344**
  Established urban migrants 0.026 −0.013
  Recent urban migrants 0.237** −0.183**
  Established rural migrants −0.044
−0.357**
  Recent rural migrants 0.108** −0.445**
Living status (Reference: living with urban registration spouse)
  Individually 0.095** −0.011
  With rural registration spouse −0.029
−0.071**
Recent within city move 0.306** −0.043**
N 4239 4239
Degree of freedom 27 27
Hous Stud. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2013 October 23.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
Logan et al. Page 21
Market rental value Discount ratio
Adjusted R-squared 0.345 0.309
Notes:
*p < 0.05
**p < 0.01.
Dependent variable for the first model is ln (predicted market value of public rental housing). Dependent variable for the second model is (1-
(actual public housing rent)/(predicted market value)).
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